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Abstract 
In this study, we present a review of research of accounting in family firms. The aim is to summarize 
the main findings of prior studies and identify what we have learned so far about the role of accounting 
in family firms. Specifically, we survey the contributions of accounting researchers to the study of 
family firms in four subfields: (1) financial accounting and reporting, (2) management accounting and 
management control, (3) auditing, and (4) accounting history. After considering some theoretical and 
empirical advancements of family business research in other disciplines, we conclude by identifying 
avenues for future research. 
Keywords: Accounting Research; Family Firms; Financial Accounting; Management Accounting; 
Auditing; Accounting History; Literature Review 
 
1. Introduction 
Family businesses play a significant role in the economy. In the European Union (EU), they 
make up for more than 60% of all companies, including sole proprietors to large multinational 
corporations (EU 2017). In the United States (US), family firms represent close to 33% of the 
S&P 500 Industrials firms and 48% of the S&P 1500 firms (Khalil and Mazboudi 2016).   
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Following the development of research on family business in areas such as business, 
management and entrepreneurship, accounting researchers have increasingly showed an 
interest in the accounting and reporting practices of family firms. In order to understand to what 
extent accounting practices of family firms differ from those of non-family firms, accounting 
researchers have adopted the research questions, approaches and methods used in prior research 
investigating non-family businesses. 
If family firms “think and act differently” (Moores and Salvato 2009, 186), then we expect 
differences in their accounting and reporting decisions when compared to non-family 
businesses. Their unique characteristics include the concentrated ownership in the hands of a 
controlling family, the power of the controlling family to pursue their goals, the involvement 
of the family in the governance of the firm, and the close relationship between managers and 
the family (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, and Dekker 2014; Steier, Chrisman, 
and Chua 2015). Importantly, the relevance of non-economic factors such as reputation, social 
capital and the long-term survival for family firms is significantly higher than in the case of 
non-family firms (Arregle et al.  2007; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, and Imperatore 2014). 
Even though the interest of accounting researchers on family businesses is relatively new, 
several literature reviews have been published in the last few years with the aim to identify the 
dominant themes and avenues for future research (e.g., Salvato and Moores 2010; Songini, 
Gnan, and Malmi 2013; Prencipe et al. 2014). This study supplements these preliminary 
insights in several ways. First, we summarize and assess the findings of prior reviews. Second, 
we update the state-of-the-art of accounting research in family business by examining the 
papers published since 2014 to present (2017). Third, we add some insights from prior research 
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in accounting history, a subfield neglected in previous reviews. Finally, we add some additional 
insights regarding future research.  
To focus the paper, we limit the review to certain areas of accounting research1. First, we focus 
on financial accounting and on what we have learned so far about financial reporting quality, 
earnings management, disclosures and accounting choices in family firms. This is by far the 
most developed area in accounting and family firms. Second, we review studies on managerial 
accounting, with an emphasis on management accounting practices and the drivers of 
management accounting change in family firms. Third, we review studies examining the 
demand for auditing, the choice of auditor and audit fees. Finally, we discuss the contribution 
of accounting history research to our understanding of accounting in family firms. 
The challenges of research on family firms open a number of possibilities for future work. First, 
from a theoretical perspective, we concur with prior research (e.g., Salvato and Moores 2010) 
suggesting that future studies could benefit from adopting a theoretical approach beyond the 
agency framework dominant in previous studies. Second, as far as the empirics is concerned, 
researchers should go beyond the dichotomy of family firms versus non-family firms in order 
to capture the heterogeneity within family firms. Researchers should be more willing to use a 
mix of data (e.g., archival data together with survey data or case studies) to explore the universe 
of family firms. Importantly, like in other research areas on family firms (e.g., see Bravo et al. 
2017) qualitative approaches could provide new insights about the role of accounting in family 
firms.  
                                                          
1 We do not include studies accounting information systems, corporate social responsibility and taxation. Similarly, 
we do not include papers in corporate governance unless they have a clear link with financial accounting research 
(for a review of corporate governance studies on family firms see Steier et al. (2015)). 
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There are a number of areas in accounting research examining family firms worth exploring in 
future research such as the variation of accounting practices of family firms across jurisdictions, 
the influence of management accounting systems on succession, or auditor’s judgment in the 
context of family firms. Finally, a historical perspective using single case studies may also help 
to grasp a better understanding of accounting in family businesses. We conclude by arguing 
that accounting scholars could benefit from adopting an interdisciplinary approach and 
collaborate with researchers with expertise on family firms from other areas of knowledge.  
The paper is structured as follows. We first introduce accounting research and the role of 
accounting in family firms. In this section we comment on prior literature reviews, explain how 
we conducted the review and show the main results. We also briefly discuss the concept of 
family business. In Section 3, we examine studies related to financial reporting and provide a 
discussion of their main findings. In Section 4, we focus on studies on management accounting 
in family firms. Sections 5 and 6 focus on auditing studies and on accounting history 
respectively. Section 7 provides some insights for future research and Session 8 concludes.  
2. The Role of Accounting in Family Firms 
The research area of accounting comprises a broad range of areas including financial 
accounting, managerial accounting, auditing, taxation, governance and accounting information 
systems. In this paper, we focus on four main sub-disciplines in the area: financial accounting 
and reporting, managerial accounting, auditing and accounting history. While financial 
accounting deals mainly with the communication of organizations to external users such as 
shareholders, investors, creditors or suppliers, management accounting involves providing 
information to internal users, primarily managers. Research topics in the field include the 
quality of the financial information and the impact of accounting choices. Managerial 
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accounting research topics include studies on formal and informal control systems and the 
decision to adopt different management control systems. Auditing, although linked to the broad 
area of financial accounting, is considered a separate discipline. Auditing research focuses on 
issues such as the demand of auditing services, the characteristics of auditors, and the pricing 
strategy of audit firms among other topics. Accounting history aims to understand the 
development of accounting practices as well as how accounting affects individuals, 
organizations and society over time (Walker 2009; Carnegie and Napier 2012).  
2.1. Accounting in Family Firms 
Family firms have unique characteristics that explain why we expect their accounting and 
accountability practices to be different from those of non-family firms. These unique 
characteristics include the concentrated ownership in the hands of a controlling family, the 
power of the controlling family to pursue their goals, the involvement of the family in the 
governance of the firm, the interest of the controlling family in the long-term survival of the 
firm, the close relationship between managers and the family, and the relevance of non-
economic factors such as reputation, the emotional attachment of the family to the business, 
and the “dual” social capital  (firm social capital and family social capital) present in family 
businesses (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Villalonga and Amit 2006; Arregle et al. 2007; Gomez-
Mejia et al.  2011). These traits are key drivers of business decisions in general and of 
accounting decisions in particular.  
2.2. Prior Reviews of Research on Accounting in Family Firms 
In the last few years we have seen a significant increase in the number of studies exploring 
accounting issues within the context of family businesses. The growing interest is reflected in 
the special issues  published on Family Business Review, Journal of Family Business Strategy 
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and European Accounting Review and in the publication of several literature reviews on the 
topic (e.g., Bhaumik and Gregoriou 2010; Salvato and Moores 2010; Songini et al. 2013; 
Prencipe et al. 2014; Senftlechner and Hiebl 2015; Sousa-Paiva, Costa-Lourenço, and Castelo-
Branco 2016; Helsen et al. 2017). Table 1 presents a short summary of prior reviews on 
accounting and family firms. 
Salvato and Moores (2010) develop a framework to identify the specific features of accounting 
practices in family firms and an agenda for future research. They find 47 articles published 
since the 1980s, most of them related to financial accounting (35 papers, 75%). They identify 
nine (19%) papers on auditing and three (6%) on management accounting. Except for three 
papers, all are empirical and quantitative and the dominant approach was the agency theory. 
They develop a list of research questions in financial accounting, managerial accounting and 
auditing, with a suggestion of the possible approaches, methods and empirical contexts to 
consider. They also propose the adoption of theoretical approaches different to the dominant 
agency theory.  
Songini et al. (2013) follow the methodology adopted by Salvato and Moores (2010) to identify 
the papers published in the period 2010 -2013. They identify 16 papers, half of them related to 
financial accounting issues such as earnings management, disclosure practices and earnings 
quality, and the other half to managerial accounting topics like balanced scorecard, management 
accounting practices and the role of the CFO. The authors conclude by arguing that the 
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Table 1. Articles Reviewing Accounting and Family Firms Research 
 











 Discussion of the mechanisms by which families retain control over firms and the incentives of family firms to expropriate other 
non-family shareholders.  
 Examination of the role of EM to facilitate tunneling 
 Opportunities for further research: expand the research on EM in other settings and undertake cross-country comparisons.  
 
Helsen et al. 
(2017) 




 Comprehensive review of literature on choice of management control systems (MCS) in family firms.  
 Studies are organized in three areas: i) papers examining a specific management control tool; ii) papers examining the determinants 
of the choice of MCS; and iii) outcomes of the choice of MCS.  














 Discussion of the theoretical and empirical challenges of accounting researchers when analyzing family firms. Review of the four 
main theoretical approaches used in family firms. Discussion of how to define “family firms”.  
 Comprehensive review of studies on accounting research in family firms. Articles classified based on: a) key issues addressed; b) 
theoretical framework adopted; and c) operational definition of family firm.  

















 Comprehensive review of literature on accounting and family firms. Contributions in three areas: a) financial accounting, with an 
emphasis of EM; b) management accounting; and c) auditing.   
 Discussion of the potential extension of research in the area, with some suggestions for research questions and possible approaches, 










Business Source Elite, 
EMERALD, SAGE 
Journals, SpringerLink, 





 Comprehensive review of empirical literature on management accounting (MA) and management control (MC) in family firms.  
 Reviewed papers are classified based on type of article and geographical area, data collection and period, sample size and firm size 
and informant and analytical approach. Discussion of definition of “family business”.  
 Findings of prior research are classified based on three categories: antecedents, configurations and outcomes of MA and MC.  
 Research questions for future research about informal and formal MA and MC systems, knowledge transmission, link between 














 Discussion of prior research around three key family business characteristics: i) involvement of the family in the management: ii) 
ownership and governance, and iii) the socioemotional wealth and succession. 
 Following Salvato and Moores (2010), it updates of the state-of-the-art of accounting research for the period 2010-2013. It considers 
journals not included in the prior review.  
 Summary of the papers included in the special issue and suggestions for future research.  
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 Comprehensive review of literature on EM in family firms.  
 Summary of the three main theoretical frameworks used in prior studies: agency, stewardship and SEW approaches.  







FBR AU N/A 




 Opportunities for audit judgment and decision-making (JDM) research in family firms. Discussion about the theoretical framework 
for Audit JDM Research. Discussion of the task, individual and individual interactions in this context.  
 Review of some key prior studies on accounting, auditing and corporate governance of family firms. Discussion on how their 
findings may contribute to future audit research.  
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
* See the list of journals and acronyms in the Appendix. WP: Working Paper.  
**Field: AU (Auditing), FA (Financial Accounting), MA (Managerial Accounting), EM (Earnings Management) 
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Prencipe et al. (2014) review four theoretical frameworks widely used in family business 
research in management (agency framework, stewardship theory, Resource-Based View (RBV) 
of the firm and Socioemotional Wealth (SEW) approach) and discuss the key empirical 
challenge in this field: how to define and operationalize the concept of family firm. Before 
giving some suggestions for future research, they provide a review of the papers since the 
1980s. Their search strategy is more limited than the one used by Salvato and Moores (2010) 
as they exclude terms such as “privately held firms” when there is no clear analysis or evidence 
related to family issues (Prencipe et al. 2014, 369). They identify 38 papers, 16 (42%) were 
included in Salvato and Moores (2010), five (13%) were published before 2010 but not included 
in Salvato and Moores (2010), and 15 (40%) were published in the period 2010-2014.  
These reviews clearly show the dominance of studies on financial accounting issues. By far, 
the most popular topic is financial reporting quality, especially “earnings management” (EM). 
Bhaumik and Gregoriou (2010) examine prior research on EM in family firms, with a focus on 
the mechanisms by which families retain control and their incentives to expropriate resources 
from non-family shareholders. Sousa-Paiva et al. (2016) also review studies contributing to this 
specific area (see details in Table 1). Senftlechner and Hiebl (2015) and Helsen et al. (2017) 
argue that prior literature reviews omit a significant number of papers on management 
accounting and control in family firms published in the last few years. Senftlechner and Hiebl 
(2015) identify 33 articles examining management accounting and control in the context of 
family firms for the period 1985-2012 and Helsen et al. (2017) identify 32 articles for the period 
1990-2015. These reviews classified the contributions in three groups: (i) studies examining the 
antecedents of management accounting and control in family firms; (ii) studies analyzing the 
configurations of these practices; and (iii) studies focused on the outcomes of the choice of 
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management accounting and controls systems. In contrast with prior reviews, Helsen et al. 
(2017) included papers related to compensation and human resources management (HRM) if 
they relate to management controls. As far as auditing research is concerned, Trotman and 
Trotman (2010) provide an interesting discussion about the potential theories and methods that 
can be used to address research questions on the audit of family firms from an audit Judgment 
and Decision Making (audit JDM) research perspective. To our knowledge, no previous 
literature review has considered the contributions of accounting history research to the area of 
family firms.  
We complement these reviews by updating the state-of-the-art of accounting research in the 
area. We carried out an analysis of the papers published in the period 2014 to 2017. To identify 
the studies, we consider the journals in Salvato and Moores (2010), Songini et al. (2013) and 
Prencipe et al. (2014)2. For the search strategy, we use the keywords of Salvato and Moores 
(2010, 195). This search resulted in 31 relevant articles, four of which are the literature reviews 
displayed in Table 1. Table 2 describes the remaining 27 papers and one article published in 
2013 (Ho and Kang 2013) which, in spite of its relevance, was not included in previous reviews. 
We also include two working papers (WP): Cruz, Imperatore and Gomez-Mejia (2015) and 
Mengoli and Pazzaglia (2017). Out of the 30 papers displayed in Table 2, 16 (53%) are related 
to financial accounting, five (17%) discuss issues related to management accounting and control 
and nine (30%) examine auditing issues. Most papers are empirical and adopt an agency 
framework. 
 
                                                          
2 The list of journals included in these reviews and in our study are available in the Appendix. We acknowledge 
the potential bias in our results due to the omission of some journals in the search strategy.   
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Table 2. Reviewed Research on Accounting in Family Firms- Period 2014-2017 (excluding accounting history) 











Family firms engage less in real EM and exhibit more earnings-decreasing accruals-based 
EM than non-family firms. Family firms treat these two types of EM as substitutes; non-
family firms, however, treat them more as complementary tools for EM.  
 
Bardhan, Li and Wu 
(2015) 
AH FA Internal controls Agency Empirical S&P 500 
 
Family firms exhibit more material weaknesses in their internal control over financial 
reporting than non-family firms. The greater likelihood of material weaknesses is driven by 
family firms with dual-class shares. Results consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis that 
family owners are motivated to maintain weaker internal controls to extract private benefits.  
 
Barroso, Ali and 
Lesage (2016)  





There is a U-shaped relation between blockholder ownership and audit fees in the shareholder 
corporate governance model; and an inverted U-shaped relation between blockholder 
ownership and audit fees in the stakeholder corporate governance model. The results hold 
when considering family firms, which suggest that the importance of the context goes beyond 
firm characteristics. 
 
Cesaroni and Sentuti 
(2017) 
JFBM MA Role of Accountants  
Empirical. 
Survey.  
175 auditors, Italy 
 
Accountants are mostly concerned with technical elements/solutions and less careful about 
relations and communication between family members. They underestimate the relevance of 
the ability to empathize with the family. This may cause a discrepancy between family firm 
expectations and accountant’s professional practice.  
 
Chen, Chen and 
Cheng (2014) 
EAR FA Conservatism Agency Empirical S&P 1500 
 
Conservatism increases with non-CEO family ownership (family owners have the incentives 
and the ability to implement conservative financial reporting to reduce legal liability and 
mitigate agency conflicts). This relationship is not significant in family firms with founders 
serving as CEOs. 
 








6950 firms from 
80 countries 
 
In the transition to International Accounting Standards (IAS), family firms tend not to 
voluntarily switch from local GAAP to IAS. IAS adoption differentially influences private 
firms, family firms versus non-family firms, in terms of their access to debt capital. 
 
Collin, Ahlberg, 
Berg, Broberg and 
Karlsson (2017) 






In family firms, auditors primarily perform the monitoring role of the audit. However, there 
are indications of the auditor performing the consigliere role, through performing the 
advisory and mediating functions and, to a smaller degree, the conveying function.  
 
Corten, Steijvers 
and Lybaert (2015) 
ABR AU Demand of auditing Agency Empirical 482 firms, US 
 
Reviews/compilations done by auditors seem to be sufficient and more cost-effective in the 
context of family firms to mitigate Type I agency costs compared to audits. The level of 
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Study Journal* Field** Topic Theory Method Sample/Case Findings 
Corten, Steijvers 
and Lybaert (2017) 






High quality auditors are hired by family firms to mitigate agency conflicts. Monitoring 
effectiveness of the board weakens the association between the level of intra-family agency 
conflicts and audit (quality) demand. The audit demand effect caused by intra-family agency 








SEW Empirical  European firms. 
 
Family firms are less likely to smooth earnings as capital market conditions deteriorate 
compared to non-family firms. Family firms are less likely to opportunistically smooth 









No evidence of a significant relationship between the use of formal financial controls and 
firm performance. However, the use of HRM control systems has a positive impact on 












Leadership and the management control system (MCS) of family firms are embedded in its 
societal culture. The owner and his/her circle may play crucial roles in producing and 
reproducing the legitimate MCS based on the extended family concept. Cultural control based 
on shared family norms is the most dominant one and simplifies process and result controls.  
 
Ghosh and Tang 
(2015) 
JAE AU 







Auditors charge family firms significantly less fees, and the fee difference shrinks in 
magnitude when family firms have high audit risk. Overall, family firms have lower audit 
risk and their auditors work less to provide assurance. These results are consistent with family 








Agency Empirical S&P 1500 
 
Family firms are less likely to provide management earnings forecasts when their CEO's 
wealth is higher in contrast with non-family firms. The main result holds when a family 








SEW Conceptual  
 
Integrated framework to financial reporting decisions in family firms based on the SEW 
theory. Several propositions regarding the probability of the firms to engage EM and to 
produce voluntary disclosures depending on two dimensions of SEW: “family control and 
influence” and “family identification”.  
 
Greco, Ferramosca 




Agency Empirical 142 firms, Italy  
 
Family firms use write-offs in a way that is consistent with performance. Non-family firms, 
however, use write-offs for EM purposes. This result is consistent with reduced Type I 
agency conflict in the case of family firms as compared to non-family firms. There is no 
evidence of family entrenchment (i.e., family owners being concerned with the reputational 
damage associated with a decrease in assets’ value). 
 





Agency Empirical S&P 1500 
 
Family firms are less likely to hire top-tier auditors and incur in lower audit fees than non-
family firms. The tendency of family firms to hire non-top-tier auditors and to pay lower 
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3559 listed firms 
from Canada, 
France, Italy, 
Spain, UK, US 
 
The contest to the dominant family shareholder is relevant for EM: in family firms, the more 
challenge to the control of dominant shareholders, the less EM. This contest is more 
important in civil law countries where shareholders’ rights are less protected. Consistent with 
the view that non-family shareholders are under more public scrutiny and have more 
difficulty to agree with the largest family shareholder, a second or third non-family 
shareholder can reduce or alleviate EM. 
 
Kang (2014) AH AU Auditor choice Agency Empirical S&P 1500 
 
Family firms are more likely to appoint industry-specialist auditors than non-family firms. 
Family firms with a family member acting as CEO or with dual-class shares have even a 











Big 4 auditors perceive family firms from which the incumbent auditors resigned as being 
less risky than their non-family firms’ counterparts. They are also more likely to serve as 
successor auditors following auditor resignations in family firms as opposed to non-family 
firms. The changes in audit fees following the resignations in family firms are significantly 
smaller than those in non-family firms after controlling for several factors. The likelihood of 
financial restatements in family firms in the post-resignation period is significantly lower 
than in non-family firms.  
 
Ma, Ma and Tian 
(2017) 
EAR FA Corporate opacity Agency Empirical 705 firms, China 
 
Family control is associated with a lower cost of debt on average and a negative impact exists 
mainly in firms with relatively low corporate opacity. The moderating effect of corporate 
opacity becomes more pronounced when investors’ perception of controlling families’ moral 
hazard of expropriation is higher.  
 
Mengoli and 












The institutional development of a country influences the association between family 
ownership and reporting quality. Well-developed formal institutions have a more beneficial 
effect on the earnings quality of non-family firms than that of family firms. Informal 
institutions (families) have a positive influence on firm behavior in countries where formal 











Empirical S&P 500 
 
Founder family firms are less likely than non-founder family firms to use EM. The effect 















Family ownership is associated with greater control and monitoring of managerial decisions, 
thus avoiding information asymmetries. Family owners impose a stronger discipline and 
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Study Journal* Field** Topic Theory Method Sample/Case Findings 









There is a non-linear relationship between family ownership and disclosures of intellectual 
capital. Family duality (i.e., when the CEO and chairperson’s position are occupied by 
individuals of the same family) is negatively associated with the extent of such disclosures. 
 













Family ownership has different effect on the quality of cash flow reporting in different 
countries and country-level regulation moderates these effects differently. Cash flow 
manipulation through classification shifting i) occurs in India and US, although it is stronger 
in the US; ii) in India it is stronger for family firms than for non-family firms; iii) it increased 
in India after changes in corporate governance regulation; and iv) has decreased (increased) 
for non-family firms after regulation in India (US) along with an increase of increase 





Jansson (2016)  
JSMED 
 





Family firms use less formal planning than non-family firms. The results show a strongly 
positive relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and the use of formal short-term 
planning and long-term planning.  





Agency  Empirical 146 firms, Italy 
 
The involvement of the family in the management is positively related to agency cost control 
systems. Family involvement in governance, however, is negatively related to agency cost 
control systems. The use of these mechanisms affect firm performance. 
 











Strongly governed family firms are more likely to choose specialist auditors and exhibit 
higher earnings quality than a) non-family firms and b) other family firms. Weakly governed 
family firms demand lower audit effort, exhibit earnings quality (no different from non-
family firms. Evidence that strong board governance can effectively mitigate the adverse 










324 listed firms, 
Israel 
 
Family ownership is associated with less material weaknesses in internal controls. 
Material weakness in internal controls in family owned firms are associated with lower 
earnings quality than in the case of non-family firms. Investors react more negatively to 
material weaknesses in internal controls of family firms than non-family firms.  
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
* See the list of journals and acronyms in the Appendix. WP: Working Paper.  
**Field: AU (Auditing), FA (Financial Accounting), MA (Managerial Accounting). 
(a) This paper published in 2013 is included because it was not included in the previous reviews. 
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We complement the search by considering the contributions in the field of accounting history. 
For that purpose, we add to the list of journals described above several mainstream accounting 
journals where accounting historians publish their work (Abacus, Accounting and Business 
Research, and Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal) as well as specialist journals 
in accounting history (Accounting, Business and Financial History, Accounting Historians 
Journal, Accounting History and Accounting History Review).  The search resulted in 10 papers 
summarized in Table 3. 
2.3.Defining Family Firms 
A key challenge in family business research is to define what exactly constitutes a “family firm” 
(Astrachan, Klein and Smyrnios 2002; Sharma 2004; Diéguez-Soto, López-Delgado and Rojo-
Martínez 2015). The lack of a general definition, together with the variety of operational 
definitions adopted in prior studies, may explain the absence of conclusive results regarding the 
differences between family and nonfamily firms reported in prior research (Casillas et al. 2015; 
Diéguez-Soto et al. 2015).  
The study “Overview of Family Business. Relevant Issues”, conducted on behalf of the 
European Commission (EC), reviewed the definitions of “family business” in 33 countries and 
found 90 different definitions (KMU Forschung Austria 2008). Based on the results of this 
study, the EC proposes the following definition for family business:  
“A firm, of any size, is a family business, if: (1) The majority of decision-making rights is in the 
possession of the natural person(s) who established the firm, or in the possession of the natural 
person(s) who has/have acquired the share capital of the firm, or in the possession of their spouses, 
parents, child or children’s direct heirs. (2) The majority of decision-making rights are indirect or 
direct. (3) At least one representative of the family or kin is formally involved in the governance 
of the firm. (4) Listed companies meet the definition of family enterprise if the person who 
established or acquired the firm (share capital) or their families or descendants possess 25 per 
cent of the decision-making rights mandated by their share capital.” (EC 2009, 10).  
 
Volume 2, Number 2, 97-159, July-December 2017                  doi:10.1344/jesb2017.2.j032           
doi.org/10.1344/JESB201x.x.j0xx  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
112 
Table 3. Research on Accounting History and Family Firms 
Study Journal* Field** Topic Theory Method Sample/Case Findings 
Álvarez-Dardet and 
Capelo (2003) 








Accounting change is driven by internal factors (e.g., the separation between ownership 
and management and others changes of the contractual relationships within the firm) and 
external factors (e.g., the general level of economic activity and government legislation). 
Caution about the interpretation of concepts such as opportunism and morality today 
















Medina Garvey. Spain. 
1904-1969 
 
Management accounting change drivers are strongly influenced by actors’ interest and by 
the perception and interpretation that actors make about institutional contradictions or 
external critical events and their effects. Both process and content of accounting change 














Unilever and its top executives were considered a “retarding factor in the modernization 
of financial reporting” in Britain, in relation to its role in the deliberations previous to the 
approval of the Companies Act 1947. The paper aims to rehabilitate the image of the 
company. It shows that Unilever’s top executives were already considering consolidated 
financial reporting and other innovative financial reporting practices during the 1930s 
and 1940s. These changes coincided with the transformation of the company from a 












The impact of the Company Act of July 1867 requiring statutory audit for French limited 
companies is illustrated by examining two companies: a family firm (personal 
capitalism) and a managerial firm. In spite of the differences in the governance and 
capital structure of the two companies, in both cases the auditor was considered above all 
“the right-hand man” of the board, playing the role of advisers to the board, and working 















the firm.  
Case study 
J & P Coats Ltd. 
Britain. 1890-1960 
 
The evidence shows that consolidation accounting, the control and funding of 
subsidiaries, the private and confidential ledgers kept by the company and the 
management accounting practices contributed to organizational control. Discussion of 
Chandler’s arguments regarding the role of accounting and finance in the success and 
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Topic Theory Method Sample/Case Findings 
Matthew (2006) AHIS 
AH 
AU 







The features of auditing techniques before 1960s were appropriate for the typical audit 
clients: family firms. Auditors more like advisors for the accounting. Family control of 
largest manufacturers declined from 50% in 1950 to 30% in 1970: significant impact on 
audit procedures. The decline of family control and professionalization of management 
explains changes in auditing procedures in the 1960s. Significant changes in the 1980s 
due to the use of concepts such as risk assessments or analytical reviews.  
 

















The accounting of the system reported and accounted for the operations of the company 
producing standardized information. But there were important shortcomings in the 
accounting information, which negatively impact on managerial decisions by creating the 
“accounting reality”. It is also highlighted that the role of accounting records in business 
history research must be underscored because accounting records are prepared within a 
specific organizational context. 
 
Popp (2000) ABFJ 
AH 
AU 
Role of Auditors  Case study 
Mintons Ltd. UK. 
1870-1900 
 
The paper argues that a “signaling strategy” may be behind the motivations of a family 
business like Mintons to hire professional (“elite”) external auditors. Auditors act more 
advisors than independent reviewers, giving strategic business advice beyond accounting 
issues –and auditors’ advices were sometimes rejected. 
  
Robb, Shanahan and 
Lord (2006) 
AHIS AH Professionalization Agency Case study 




The paper provides evidence of the changes experienced by a family firm, through 
restructuring under outside professional management, until being taken over by a 
multinational company.  
 







 Case study 




In spite of being the most successful and important lead-mining company in American 
history, the company did not adopt a system of cost accounts until late in the nineteenth 
century (later than other companies). Close association of industrial accounts and the 
double-entry bookkeeping system, as in other mining companies in the UK. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
* See the list of journals and acronyms in the Appendix.  
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From an empirical perspective, the challenge is how to operationalize a given definition of 
family business. The focus of most prior research has been to identify the characteristics of 
family firms so that they can be distinguished from non-family firms (Chua, Chrisman and 
Sharma 1999; Sharma 2004; Chua et al.  2012). However, more and more researchers have 
recognized the necessity of exploring the heterogeneity of family firms (Wright and 
Kellermanns 2011; Chua et al. 2012)3.  
Most operational definitions emphasize the involvement of the family firm in the business. 
From this perspective, family involvement is a sufficient condition to make a firm a family 
business –the components-of-involvement approach (Chrisman, Chua and Sharma 2005, 556). 
This has been the dominant approach in accounting studies, which typically have adopted 
dichotomous variables based on proxies for family involvement such as “percentage of 
ownership of the family” (e.g., Mengoli and Pazzaglia 2017), “family members’ involvement 
on top management and/or board” (e.g., Chen, Chen and Cheng 2014) or a combination of 
ownership and management/control indicators (e.g., Cascino et al. 2010; Martin, Tochman-
Campbell and Gomez-Mejia 2016) to identify family and non-family firms. This approach has 
been criticized because it does not take into account the goals of family firms and how their 
views may change over time (Chrisman et al. 2005). To overcome these limitations, researchers 
have focused on the “essence” of family firms (the essence approach) which aims to take into 
account factors such as a firm’s behavior, intention and vision (Chua et al. 1999). From this 
perspective, family involvement is only a necessary condition –such family involvement must 
be “directed toward behaviors that produce certain distinctiveness before it can be considered 
a family firm” (Chrisman et al. 2005, 557). Accounting studies such as Stockmans, Lybaert and 
                                                          
3 Studies such as Chua et al. (1999), Astrachan et al. (2002), Sharma (2004) and more recently Chua et al. (2012) 
and Diéguez-Soto et al. (2015) provide literature reviews on the definition of family business. 
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Voodeckers (2013) follow this approach and define family firms taking into account the 
involvement of the family (ownership, management and control) as well as the CEO’s 
perception about the firm being a family firm.  
In both the components-of-involvement and the essence approaches, researchers typically use 
dichotomous variables based on the relevant criteria to distinguish family and non-family firms. 
Astrachan et al. (2002, 46) argues, however, that “artificially dichotomizing family vs. non-
family firms when no such clear-cut dichotomy exists creates more problems than it attempts 
to solve” and that “there are discrete and particular qualities or characteristics of a business that 
are more appropriately measured on a continuous rather than dichotomous scale”. Accordingly, 
they propose a more sophisticated measure of the extent and manner of family involvement in 
and influence on the firm using a continuous scale, which combines information about three 
relevant dimensions: power, experience and culture (the F-PEC index of family influence; see 
also Klein, Astrachan, and Smyrnios 2005). In our review, the only study that have adopted 
(indirectly) the framework proposed by Astrachan et al. (2002) is Dekker et al.  (2015). They 
follow Astrachan et al.’s (2002) work to develop a survey able to assess the amount of 
nonfamily involvement within the management team.  
The challenge of defining family firms is far from being resolved. Furthermore, assuming that 
researchers agree on a definition of family firm, its operationalization is always problematic. 
As highlighted by Evert et al. (2016, 28), the real difficulty lies in measuring the intangible 
attributes associated with any given definition of family firm. In the last section, we briefly 
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3. Financial Accounting and Reporting in Family Firms 
Most prior studies on accounting and family firms are quantitative studies focused on the 
financial reporting characteristics of family firms. With few exceptions, they adopt the agency 
framework to investigate accounting choices (e.g., EM and voluntary disclosures) that impact 
on financial reporting quality of family firms compared to non-family firms. The dominance of 
the agency theory is not surprising, since mainstream accounting research is based extensively 
on the agency framework.  
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) focuses on the relationship between managers and 
owners and to what extent this relationship influences on the agency costs –i.e., the costs of all 
activities designed to align the interests of managers (agents) and owners (principals). Given 
the close relationship between the family and the managers, these costs are expected to be lower 
in the case of family firms. They are, therefore, less likely to be affected by the so-called “Type 
I” agency conflicts related to the separation of ownership and management. However, we may 
expect more prominent agency costs related to the conflict between the family owners and other 
owners –the so-called “Type II” agency problem. Specifically, there are potential agency costs 
to minority shareholders in those situations where the family acts as a dominant shareholder as 
the controlling family may try to maximize its private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Villalonga and Amit 2006; Bhaumik and Gregoriou 2010). Furthermore, agency 
costs can also arise from lender-owner conflicts of interests (Chrisman, Chua, and Litz 2004)4.  
Research based on the agency theory has put forward two opposing views about the association 
between family control and the quality of accounting decisions. On the one hand, the interest 
                                                          
4 For an analysis of agency relations and agency costs in family firms, see Schulze et al. (2001) and Chrisman et 
al. (2004) respectively. 
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of the controlling family in the long-term survival of the firm as well as the privileged position 
of the family to supervise and monitor managers may lead to better accounting decisions, which 
in turn will lead to higher reporting quality (the alignment hypothesis). On the other hand, the 
controlling family may manipulate the information about the actual performance to expropriate 
the wealth of other (minority) shareholders. From this perspective, the presence of a controlling 
family is expected to be associated to accounting decisions of lower quality (the entrenchment 
hypothesis). 
3.1.Financial Reporting Quality 
Financial reporting quality refers to the usefulness of the information contained in the annual 
reports. Earnings management (EM) and voluntary disclosures are considered two key tools 
firms can use to influence the quality of financial reporting (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2014). Given 
their relevance in prior literature, we explore them in the following sections.  
The results about the association between family ownership and financial reporting quality are 
mixed. Studies such as Wang (2006), Tong (2007) and Cascino et al. (2010) find that family 
firms provide accounting information of higher quality than non-family firms do. Other studies, 
however, provide evidence of a negative relationship between family control and quality of 
financial reporting (e.g., Prencipe, Markarian, and Pozza 2008; Yang 2010).  
Using conservatism as a proxy for financial reporting quality, Chen et al. (2014) provide 
evidence of a positive association between conservatism and family ownership. They argue that 
family owners have both the incentives and the ability to implement more conservative financial 
reporting practices to reduce the risk of legal liability and to mitigate the potential agency 
conflicts with other shareholders (alignment hypothesis). Their results support such prediction: 
conservatism increases with family ownership if and only if the founder is not acting as the 
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CEO. Such association, however, is not significant when the founder is serving as a CEO in a 
family firm. Thus, the quality of financial reporting may vary depending on the governance 
characteristics of the family firm. Srinidhi, He, and Firth (2014) differentiate between strongly 
and weakly governed family firms and find that strongly governed family firms exhibit higher 
earnings quality than other family firms. This result suggests that strong board governance can 
effectively mitigate the adverse consequences of Type II agency problems.  
Recent studies use material weaknesses in internal controls5 as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality, with no conclusive results. Weiss (2014), examining a sample of Israeli companies, 
find that family firms report less material weaknesses in internal controls suggesting higher 
financial reporting quality. However, in the presence of material weaknesses in internal 
controls, family firms produce lower earnings quality than non-family firms. Interestingly, the 
market reaction is more negative in the case of family companies. Bardhan, Lin, and Wu (2015), 
using a sample of US companies, finds opposite results: family firms exhibit more material 
weaknesses in their internal control over financial reporting than non-family firms. They also 
find that the greater likelihood of material weaknesses is driven by family firms with dual-class 
shares, in line with the entrenchment hypothesis.  
Ma, Ma, and Tian (2017) provide evidence about the consequences of corporate opacity of 
family firms. Using a sample of 705 Chinese firms, they find that corporate opacity acts as a 
moderator in companies with controlling families. The results show that family control is 
associated with a lower cost of debt on average but there is a negative impact in firms with 
                                                          
5 In this context, a material weakness in internal control is “a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in 
internal control over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of 
the company’s annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis” (Auditing 
Standard No. 5 2007). 
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relatively lower corporate performance, particularly when investors perceive a high risk of 
families’ moral hazard of expropriation.  
All papers above are based on the agency framework. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2014), in a 
conceptual paper, develop an integrated framework to financial reporting decisions in family 
firms based on the Socioemotional Wealth (SEW) approach. The SEW approach argues that 
family firms consider the nonfinancial aspects of the firm (socioemotional wealth) that meet 
the affective needs of the family, such as the perpetuation of the dynasty. Using a cost-benefit 
analysis of accounting choices, the paper develops different propositions regarding the 
probability of a firm to engage in practices that influence the financial reporting quality (EM 
and voluntary disclosures) depending on two dimensions of SEW: “family control and 
influence” and “family identification”. The empirical validation of this model is an opportunity 
for future research.  
3.2.Earnings Management 
Earnings management (EM) occurs when managers use the discretion within the accounting 
standards to alter the financial reports either to mislead shareholders about the economic 
performance of the firm or to influence contractual outcomes whose result depends on the 
reported accounting numbers (Healy and Wahlen 1999, 368). Accountants distinguish between 
real EM, which refers to decisions that affect the timing and scale of operating, investing and 
financing activities in the accounting period and accruals EM, which relate to pure accounting 
decisions. EM has been extensively examined in the accounting literature (for a review, see 
Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010) and so on the research at the intersection between accounting 
and family firms –see Bhaumik and Gregoriou (2010) and Sousa-Paiva et al. (2016).  
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A number of studies has explored to what extent family firms are more or less likely to use EM 
techniques to manipulate earnings. Adopting an agency framework, Ali, Chen, and 
Radhakrishnan (2007) and Jiraporn and Dadalt (2009) use US data to show that family firms, 
when compared to non-family businesses, are less likely to manage earnings. This result is 
supported by studies examining data from other settings. Prencipe et al. (2011) analyze a sample 
of Italian family and non-family firms and find that the probability of income smoothing 
practices is lower for family firms. Prencipe et al. (2008) find that family firms are less sensitive 
to income-smoothing motivations than their non-family firms’ counterparts, even though they 
have similar motivations to manage earnings to avoid violations of debt covenants. Research 
has also showed that the role of the board of directors on monitoring EM is affected by the 
presence of family members on the board (Prencipe and Bar-Yosef 2011) and by the proportion 
of outside directors and CEO duality when the firm faces significant agency problems between 
controlling and noncontrolling shareholders (Stockmans et al. 2013).  
Some studies have compared EM in family firms across countries, with no conclusive results. 
Martínez-Ferrero, Rodríguez-Ariza, and Bermejo-Sánchez (2015) examine a sample of listed 
companies from 20 countries and find that family ownership exerts a controlling and monitoring 
role on managerial decisions: the higher the degree of family ownership, the lower the risk of a 
conflict of interest between owners and agents, and of the expropriation risk of managers acting 
for their own benefit. These results are in line with the alignment hypothesis. Cruz et al. (2015) 
compare the behavior of European family and non-family firms and find that family firms are 
less likely to opportunistically smooth earnings as capital market conditions deteriorate.  
Studies using international samples have shown that the institutional setting matters. Gopalan 
and Jayaraman’s (2012) results suggest that a country’s institutional environment determines 
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whether insider controlled firms, including family firms, are associated with more or less EM 
than non-insider controlled firms. Specifically, insider controlled firms that operate in low 
investor protection countries are associated with more EM than their non-insider controlled 
counterparts. Mengoli and Pazzaglia (2017), using a sample of family and nonfamily firms in 
12 European countries, find that the institutional development of a country has a moderating 
effect on earnings quality. Specifically, well-developed formal institutions have a more 
beneficial effect on the earnings quality of non-family firms than that of family firms. Informal 
institutions such as families, however, are beneficial and have a particularly positive influence 
on firm’s behavior in countries with no formal institutions. Within the agency framework, Jara-
Bertin and López-Iturriaga (2014) use a sample of 3559 listed firms from Canada, France, Italy, 
Spain, the UK and the US to examine how the distribution of power among shareholders affects 
EM in family firms. They find that the more challenge to the control of dominant shareholders, 
the less EM in family firms. The legal-institutional environment affects this result: in civil law 
countries where the rights of shareholders are less protected, the contest of control becomes 
more relevant.  
The differences in the institutional environment may explain why studies based on Asian 
samples (e.g., data from Taiwan and China) find that EM increases with the level of insider 
ownership in family controlled-companies (e.g., Yang 2010; Ding, Qu, and Zhuang 2011; Chi 
et al. 2015)6 in contrast with the results of studies examining US or European samples (Ali et 
                                                          
6 Consistent with the evidence from other Asian countries, Razzaque, Ali, and Mather (2016) show that 
Bangladeshi family firms engage in more real EM than non-family firms. However, they find a curvilinear 
relationship between family ownership and real EM: it increases with the increase in family ownership and after 
reaching a certain ownership threshold, it tends to decline. 
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al. 2007; Prencipe et al. 2011)7. As suggested by Sousa-Paiva et al. (2016), this may indicate 
that the presence and influence of Type II agency problem in Asian family firms is more severe 
than in Western countries such as US or Italy. 
In contrast to the studies discussed above, which are based on the agency theory, Achleitner et 
al. (2014) adopt the SEW approach to examine EM in a sample of German firms. According to 
the SEW approach, the motivation of EM depends on whether or not the family owners give 
priority to the “family control and influence dimension” over the “family identity” dimension 
(Gomez-Mejia et al. 2014). In line with the predictions of the SEW theory, Achleitner et al. 
(2014) find that family firms are less likely to engage in real EM and in earnings-decreasing 
EM because of their interest to preserve the wealth of the company for future generations.  
Following the SEW approach, some studies have investigated to what extent EM changes 
depending on the type of family firm (e.g., Stockmans, Lyabert, and Voordeckers 2010; 
Pazzaglia, Mengoli, and Sapienza 2013; Martin et al. 2016). Stockmans et al. (2010) find that 
when the financial performance is poor, the interest of the family to preserve the SEW explains 
the decision to manipulate earnings upwards. Accordingly, in case of low performance, first 
generation and founder-led family firms engage in more in upward EM than other type of family 
firms. Pazzaglia et al. (2013) find that firms that have been acquired by the current family 
owners as a result of a market transaction show higher EM than firms created or inherited by 
the family. Consistent with prior studies, Martin et al. (2016) find that founder family firms are 
less likely than non-founder family firms to use EM, suggesting that family owners are loss 
averse with respect to the SEW of the family.  
 
                                                          
7 In the case of Portugal, Simões-Vieira (2016) finds no significant differences in the incentive to manage earnings 
between family and non-family firms in a sample of public firms the period 1999-2011.  
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3.3.Voluntary Disclosures  
Voluntary disclosures refer to the managerial decision to provide information about the 
company beyond the requirements established by regulators. Previous studies have paid 
attention to the quality and quantity of voluntary disclosures of family firms as compared to 
non-family firms. The results suggest that family firms are more likely to warn for bad news 
(e.g., Ali et al. 2007; Chen, Chen, and Cheng 2008), to make fewer disclosures about corporate 
governance (Ali et al. 2007), and to provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls (Chen 
et al. 2008). Prior studies have also examined the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on financial disclosures (Chen and Jaggi 2000).  
We identify two studies on voluntary disclosures. Golden and Kohlbeck (2017) explore the 
voluntary disclosure practices of family firms and test whether there is an association between 
the disclosure of earnings forecasts by the management and the compensation of CEOs in the 
context of family firms. Using firms of the S&P 1500, they find that family firms are less likely 
than non-family firms to provide earnings forecasts on a voluntary basis when their CEO’s 
wealth is higher. These results holds when a member of the family is acting as CEO or is a 
member of the board of directors. Muttakin, Khan, and Belal (2015) focus on non-financial 
disclosures. Using a sample of 135 Bangladeshi companies, they look at disclosures of 
intellectual capital to see whether there is an association between family ownership and non-
financial disclosures. They find that there is a non-linear relationship between family ownership 
and the disclosure of intellectual capital, which are less likely when members of the family 
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3.4.Other Accounting Decisions 
The first accounting studies providing indirect evidence on accounting decisions of family firms 
focused on the association between managerial ownership (typically high in a founder-family 
controlled firm) and accounting choices such as depreciation methods (Dhaliwal, Salamon, and 
Smith 1982) and inventory accounting methods (Niehaus 1989). Recently, Greco, Ferramosca, 
and Allegrini (2015) examine the decision to write-off long-lived assets using a sample of 
Italian companies. They find that the write-offs of long-lived assets of family firms are coherent 
with the firm performance, thereby rejecting the entrenchment hypothesis. However, non-
family firms tend to use write-offs to manipulate earnings. This evidence is consistent with 
family concerns about the reputation damage associated with a loss of a firm’s asset value, a 
characteristic that it is not detected in non-family firms. 
With the process of harmonization of accounting standards and the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in many countries, the interest in the variation of 
accounting choices across firms in different countries has decreased (Salvato and Moores 
2010). However, the adoption of IFRS has revived the interest in firms’ accounting choices and 
firms’ reaction to changes in accounting regulation. For example, Chen et al. (2016) explore to 
what extent a change in accounting standards (adoption of IFRS) influences on family and non-
family firms in their attempts to get debt financing from foreign banks. After examining 6950 
firms from 80 countries, they find that family firms tend not to change from local Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to IFRS on a voluntary basis and this has a negative 
impact on their ability to access to debt capital. Nagar and Sen (2016) compare US and Indian 
companies to examine the quality of cash flow reporting after a change in the regulation of cash 
flow reporting. They also examine to what extent there are variations between family and non-
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family firms in the two countries. They find evidence of manipulation of cash flows in India 
and the US although such manipulation is different for family and non-family firms in India.  
4. Management Accounting and Management Control in Family Firms 
Research on management accounting and control has a long tradition in accounting (e.g., 
Chenhall 2003). By management accounting practices we refer to tools such as product costing, 
budgets for planning and control, standard costing variance analysis among others. Strategic 
management accounting is also a management accounting tool, which includes techniques such 
as the Balance Scorecard or target costing (Lucas, Prowle, and Lowth 2013). In spite of its 
interest, this area of research is significantly less explored in the context of family firms than 
that of financial accounting –see Senftlechner and Hiebl (2015) and Helsen et al. (2017) for a 
comprehensive review of the literature.  
One of the challenges in management accounting research is the access to data and most studies 
rely on information collected from surveys or interviews. Prior studies on management 
accounting in family firms have focused on the following three areas: (i) drivers for the adoption 
of management accounting and control practices in family firms; (ii) type of management 
control practices adopted by family firms, and (iii) the role of management accounting in family 
firms. We explore them in the following sections.  
4.1. Drivers of Adoption of Management Accounting and Control Systems 
Prior studies have examined what drives the adoption of management accounting and control 
systems in family firms. Business size and growth are consistently considered as key drivers of 
adoption of managerial accounting practices (Giovannoni, Maraghini, and Riccaboni 2011; 
Speckbacher and Wentgest 2012). Some studies have examined the role of trust, although the 
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results are not conclusive. While some studies find that family’s trust in the management of the 
company may reduce the need for management accounting (Moilanen 2008; Tsamenyi, 
Noormansyah, and Uddin 2008; Stergiou, Ashraf, and Uddin 2013), others (e.g., Giovannoni et 
al. 2011) find that trust may be irrelevant in a scenario where the company is growing and 
facing increasing complexity. In those cases, there is a need for more formal control systems 
irrespective of the level of trust of the family in the management.  
Other papers have explored to what extent the family orientation of the business may influence 
on the adoption of management accounting practices and control systems. By and large, results 
show that higher levels of family orientation have a negative effect on the adoption of 
management accounting and control systems and on their relevance for the organization 
(Leenders and Waarts 2003; Tsamenyi et al. 2008; Uddin 2009). Results also show that the 
family’s involvement in the management is negatively associated with the use of performance 
measures in strategic target setting and incentive practices (Speckbacher and Wentges 2012). 
Human agency plays a critical role in the process of adoption of management control practices 
and on management accounting change (Hiebl, Duller, and Feldbauer-Durstmüller 2012; 
Stergiou et al. 2013; Baños-Sánchez Matamoros, Araujo-Pinzón, and Alvarez-Dardet Espejo 
2014; Efferin and Hartono 2015). Baños-Sánchez Matamoros et al. (2014), in a study on 
management accounting change in a Spanish family firm, find that the drivers of accounting 
change are strongly influenced by actors’ interests and by their perception and interpretation of 
institutional contradictions and external events. Both the type of change and the process are 
shaped by the normative influences to which the actors are subject to. Efferin and Hartono 
(2015), examining an Indonesian firm, find that there is a close relationship between the 
leadership style and the management control system adopted. They also find that the owner and 
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her/his inner circle play crucial roles in producing and reproducing the legitimate management 
control system based on the extended family concept.  
As far as the role of management accountants is concerned, Giovannoni et al. (2011) and Hiebl 
et al. (2012) find that management accountants see themselves as drivers of change. Cesaroni 
and Sentuti (2017), however, find somehow a contradictory result. Using a sample of 1756 
Italian certified accountants, they find that accountants are mostly concerned with technical 
issues showing relatively low interest in the interaction and communication with family 
members. This may cause a discrepancy between the accountant’s professional practice and the 
expectations of the family about her/his role in the company.  
4.2. Type of Management Accounting and Control Systems 
The evidence available suggests that family firms’ approach to managerial accounting differs 
significantly from the experience of non-family firms (e.g., Durendez, Madrid-Guijarro, and 
García-Pérez-de-Lema 2011; Samuelsson et al. 2016). Specifically, research shows that small 
and medium family business consider management accounting and control systems as less 
relevant than similar non-family business (Durendez et al. 2011) and that they tend to use less 
sophisticated tools (e.g., Neubauer et al. 2012; Samuelsson et al. 2016). Samuelsson et al. 
(2016), after examining data collected from 156 Swedish manufacturing firms, find that these 
firms use less formal planning than non-family firms. They also find a strong positive 
association between the entrepreneurial orientation and the use of formal planning mechanisms.  
Differences between family and non-family business tend to disappear in the case of family 
business managed by non-family members, which in turn is related to the size and complexity 
of the company as suggested above (e.g., Giovannoni et al. 2011; Speckbacher and Wentges 
2012). As far as effectiveness of management control systems is concerned, Speckbacher and 
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Wentges (2012) find no evidence between family and non-family businesses in a sample of 304 
Austrian and German companies. 
4.3. Importance of Management Accounting and Control Systems  
There are mixed results regarding the importance of management accounting processes, such 
as strategic planning or informal management control systems, for family firm performance. 
While some studies find that they have a positive influence (e.g., Songini and Ghan 2015), 
others (Dekker et al. 2015) find no association between formal financial controls and firm 
performance. Songini and Gnan (2015) use a sample of 146 Italian companies and find that 
agency cost control systems in family business affect firm performance. Dekker et al. (2015) 
examine the formal controls of a sample of Belgian family business and find no evidence of an 
association between formal financial controls and firm performance. However, they do find a 
positive effect of HRM control systems on financial performance. The lack of consistency in 
the results is not surprising, given that comparability of studies in management accounting is 
difficult due to the type of data, the variation in practices across jurisdictions and firms and the 
different approaches used by researchers.  
Studies examining the role of managerial accounting in family firms have also shown that 
management accounting practices can influence significantly the transfer of knowledge across 
generations as well as between the management team and the family (Giovannoni et al. 2011). 
However, such influence depends on the size of the company, in line with the results described 
above. In the case of medium-size firms, in contrast to large firms, the presence of a controlling 
family has a negative influence on the use and institutionalization of management accounting 
practices (Hiebl, Feldbauer-Durstmüller, and Duller 2013). 
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5. Auditing in Family Firms 
The purpose of an audit of financial statements is to express an opinion on the fairness with 
which they present, in all material respects, the financial position, results of operations and the 
cash flow statement of a company in conformity with the GAAP. The distinct characteristics of 
family firms compared to non-family firms are expected to influence on the demand for 
auditing, the audit process, and the audit outcomes (audit quality and audit fees)8. There are few 
studies on the intersection of family firms and audit research (see Trotman and Trotman 2010). 
These studies, adopting an agency framework, have focused on the demand of auditing, the 
demand for audit quality (auditor choice) and audit fees.   
5.1. Demand for Voluntary Audits 
What explains the demand for external audits of family firms? This has been the research 
question of some studies (e.g., Carey, Simnett, and Tanewski 2000; Corten, Steijvers, and 
Lybaert 2015). Given the lower Type I agency costs, family firms are expected to demand less 
voluntary external audits. Carey et al. (2000) argue that family firms consider internal and 
external audit as substitutes. Using a sample of Australian companies, they show that family 
firms demand more internal audits than voluntary external audits and that nonfamily 
involvement has a positive correlation with the demand of voluntary audits. They also show 
that the demand of voluntary external audits increases with agency costs and leverage. Corten 
et al. (2015), examining a sample of 482 US companies, argue that the level of shareholder-
debtholder agency costs seems to be a key driver for the demand of voluntary audits by family 
                                                          
8 For a review of archival auditing research, see DeFond and Zhang 2014. 
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firms. With low presence of such agency costs, other work done by auditors such as reviews 
and compilations seem to be sufficient and more cost-effective for family firms. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning the study of Collin et al. (2017). Using data collected from 309 
Swedish auditors, they find that in family firms, auditors perform primarily a monitoring role 
but they also act as consiglieres by performing the advisory and mediating functions and, to a 
smaller degree, the conveying function. The results suggest that for family firms, the demand 
for voluntary audits may be explained by factors not necessarily related to assurance of the 
financial statements.  
5.2. The Demand for Audit Quality and Choice of Auditor 
A recurrent research question in auditing is what explains the demand of “high quality audits”. 
Many studies use the type of auditor as a proxy for audit quality under the assumption that “big 
audit firms9” provide audit services of higher quality as compared to other audit firms. Studies 
on family firms have focused on two issues: a) whether family firms demand more or less audit 
quality than non-family firms, and b) what explains the decision to hire a “big auditor”. Overall, 
the evidence suggests that family firms demand less audit quality (Niskanen, Karjalainen, and 
Niskanen, 2010; Hope, Langli, and Thomas 2012; Ho and Kang 2013).  
Niskanen et al. (2010) and Ho and Kang (2013) find that increases in family ownership 
decreases the likelihood of hiring top-tier auditors. Similarly, Hope et al. (2012) show that for 
settings where the CEO is related to the major shareholders there is no greater demand for Big 
auditors. These results are in line with the alignment hypothesis. In a recent article, Corten, 
Steijvers, and Lybaert (2017) using a sample of 125 Belgian firms show that high quality 
                                                          
9 The “Big 4” today: Deloitte, E&Y, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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auditors are hired to mitigate intra-family agency conflicts. Such demand decreases when the 
family firm can reduce the agency costs internally. 
Research has also used the decision of hiring an industry-specialist auditor as a proxy for high 
audit quality. Kang (2014) find that family firms are more likely to appoint an industry-
specialist than non-family firms, and such tendency is even stronger in the case of family firms 
where the CEO belongs to the family or there are dual-class shares. In contrast to the findings 
above, these results are in line with the entrenchment argument.  In a similar vein, Srinidhi et 
al. (2014) use as a proxy for audit quality being a specialist auditor. They find that for family 
firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms there is a higher demand of high quality 
audits.  
Khalil and Mazboudi (2016) explore the resignation and appointment of a new auditor in family 
and non-family firms using a sample of US firms. They find that, after the resignation of the 
incumbent auditor, Big 4 auditors perceive family firms as being less risky than non-family 
firms and that Big 4 are more likely to accept such engagements.  
5.3. Audit Fees 
Overall, research shows that family firms demand lower audit effort and, hence, pay lower audit 
fees (Ho and Kang 2013; Ghosh and Tang 2015; Barroso, Ali, and Lesage 2016). Ho and Kang 
(2013) find that family firms incur in lower audit fees than non-family firms due to the lower 
demand for external auditing services and the auditors’ lower perception of risk in the case of 
family firms. The fees’ difference is stronger in the case of family firms where family owners 
actively monitor their firms. Ghosh and Tang (2015) report similar findings: auditors charge 
less audit fees because the superior reporting quality lowers audit risk and reduces auditors’ 
costs. Barroso et al. (2016), in a study examining the moderating role of the corporate 
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governance model on the association between blockholders’ ownership and audit fees, 
investigate the effects of family ownership as an additional analysis with results consistent with 
those reported by Ho and Kang (2013) and Ghosh and Tang (2015). Khalil and Mazboudi 
(2016) examine the changes in audit fees after the resignation of an auditor and find that the 
change is smaller in the case of family firms as compared to non-family firms.  
However, Hope et al. (2012), examining a sample of Norwegian companies, find opposite 
results about the family involvement in the management and audit fees. Specifically, they find 
that when the CEO is a member of the largest owning family, audit fees increase, which is 
consistent with the argument that when a family relationship exists, shareholders are less likely 
to act as independent monitors of the CEO. As a result, the probability of misappropriation by 
the CEO or extraction of private benefits by controlling owners increases.  
6. Accounting History 
Accounting history is an expanding and maturing sub-discipline of accounting (Walker 2009). 
It matters because it allows us to understand “accounting’s past and present and it provides 
insights into the future of accounting” (Carnegie and Napier 2012). Although the research 
interest of accounting historians on family firms is limited if compared to research done by 
economic and business historians (Fernández-Pérez and Puig 2013), some of the contributions 
bring relevant insights about the role of accounting in family firms (see Table 3)10. These studies 
focus primarily on accounting change in the context of family firms, accounting as an 
explanatory factor of success/failure, and family firms and the development of auditing.  
                                                          
10 As suggested by Mathias (1993) there is a potential synergy in the disciplines of accounting history and business 
history. While business historians can contribute by their knowledge and understanding of the context within which 
accounting evolves, accounting historians’ knowledge can help to interpret empirical, quantitative information as 
well as reduce the risks of misrepresentation.  
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6.1. Studies on Accounting Change  
We identify two studies whose aim is to provide insights about the drivers of accounting change 
from a historical perspective. Using relational contract theory, Álvarez-Dardet and Capelo 
(2003) examine a Spanish company (Almacenes Agüera) during the period 1740-1835 and 
demonstrate that accounting change was driven by internal factors (separation between 
ownership and management and changes of the contractual relationships within the firm) as 
well as by external factors (general level of economic activity and government legislation). 
Baños-Sánchez Matamoros et al. (2014) adopt an institutional entrepreneurship approach to 
examine the development of Medina Garvey, a Spanish family firm, for the period 1904-1969. 
The case illustrates how the agent-owner “rationally” promoted the transformation of 
management practices, acting as an “institutional entrepreneur”. The study also shows how both 
structures and human agency played a “mutually constitutive role in fostering and shaping 
management accounting change” (Baños-Sánchez Matamoros et al. 2014, 257).  
From a financial reporting perspective, Camfferman and Zeff (2003) investigate the origins of 
the modern and innovative consolidated financial reporting practices of Unilever in the 1940s. 
Before the World War II, Unilever and its subsidiaries were criticized for their uninformative 
reporting and the company was described as a “retarding factor in the modernization of financial 
reporting” (Camfferman and Zeff 2003, 197). However, the company and its top executives 
were already considering consolidated financial reporting and other innovative financial 
reporting practices during the 1930s and the 1940s. The paper shows that these changes 
coincided with the transformation of the company from a family-dominated firm into a 
professionally managed organization. Besides rehabilitating the image of Unilever in financial 
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reporting history, the paper also demonstrates that the company and some of its top executives 
influenced on the financial reporting reform in Britain during the 1940s. 
6.2. Role of Accounting in the Success and Failure of Family Firms 
Some studies provide insights about the key role played by financial and accounting controls 
in the success and failure of family firms (Kininmonth and McKinstry 2007; Vent and Milne 
2000; McWatters 2002; Robb, Shanahan, and Lord 2006). Kininmonth and McKinstry (2007) 
study the case of J&P Coats Ltd, one of the Britain’s largest multinational company from the 
period 1890 to 1960, and show how the consolidation accounting, the control and funding of 
subsidiaries, the private and confidential ledgers kept by the company and the management 
accounting practices contributed to organizational control. The success of the company was 
partly due to its tight accounting systems and controls, the authors argue. Vent and Milne (2000) 
examine the accounting practices of St. Joseph Lead Company. Compared to other companies 
in the mining industry during the second half of the nineteenth century, the company used a 
crude double-entry bookkeeping system and did not use detailed cost accounting records. These 
practices were far behind the practices of the contemporary mining firms.    
McWatters (2002) adopts an organizational-economics framework to examine organizational 
failure. The paper analyzes the case of the Kingston Shipping Company Ltd and the role of the 
accounting system in the development of the company at the early-twentieth century. The 
accounting system reported and accounted for the operations and produced standardized 
information although there were important shortcomings related the accounting treatment of 
investments and financing costs. By obscuring certain information, the accounting system 
created an “accounting reality” which was quite different to the actual results of the company. 
That is, “the lack of profitability would have been much more apparent had the accounting 
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reality been a different one” (McWatters 2002, 83). While the examination of accounting 
records may provide insights into actions of individual firms, McWatters (2002) argues that the 
role of accounting records in business history research must be underscored. Accounting 
records, he argues, are the result of choices and decisions at a given point and setting 
(McWatters 2002, 56). 
Robb et al. (2006) examine the transformation of Adams Bruce Ltd (a bakery in New Zealand), 
from family ownership to public ownership and professional management. Using both written 
and oral evidence, the paper shows three different narratives grounded on agency theory. The 
family narrative describes a company with more than 50 years with sustained growth. There 
was an accountant who was there for 40 years and the family felt that his skills and the 
accounting systems, focused on cost control through variance analysis, enabled the firm to 
achieve operational efficiency. The professionally managed firm narrative starts when an 
outsider was appointed as CEO. Conflicts were frequent between the new appointed team and 
the “old school”. Importantly, the use of informal communication networks common in the 
previous period declined, with negative consequences of the company. Costs increased 
significantly leading to a less efficient company when compared to the previous situation. Part 
of the problem was the lack of planning for the transition from a family controlled company to 
a non-family controlled company. Finally, the narrative of the takeover period evidences that 
control can be quickly changed in the case of listed companies. This company is an example 
supporting the claim that family firms can be in some instances more efficient than non-family 
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6.3.The Origins of Auditing and Family Firms 
Some accounting historians have paid attention to the link between the development of auditing 
as a practice and family firms (e.g., Popp 2000; Matthews 2006; Fourness-Datin 2014). Popp 
(2000) investigates the role of auditors and auditors’ reports in the context of “personal 
capitalism” (Lloyd-Jones and Lewis 1994). The paper focuses on Mintons Ltd, a firm owned 
by a single family with no external investors, where the family is involved in the day-to-day 
management and the family name is considered as a guarantee of quality in the market. It 
provides some insights about Mintons’ motivations to hire professional external auditors. Like 
in other cases at that time, auditors acted more as advisors than as independent reviewers. The 
audit reports show how auditors positioned themselves as providers of strategic business advice 
beyond accounting issues, although their recommendations were sometimes disregarded. 
Minton’s employment of “elite” auditors (Deloitte, Dever, Griffith and Co.) could be seen as a 
signaling strategy, “conveying images of status and professionalism commensurate with the 
reputation of this long-established firm” (Popp 2000, 363).  
Matthews (2006) collected data from interviews to retired and practicing chartered accountants 
and from postal questionnaires to investigate the changes in auditing techniques over time. The 
study shows that auditing techniques before 1960s fitted the needs of family firms, the typical 
audit clients at the time. In line with Popp (2000), auditors were perceived as advisors willing 
to help owners to prepare the accounting of the business instead of an independent third party. 
However, the changes in family control of companies over time had a significant impact on 
audit procedures. Specifically, he shows that the decline of family control and 
professionalization of management explains changes in auditing procedures in the 1960s.   
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Finally, Fourness-Datin (2014) examines the impact of the Company Act of July 1867 requiring 
statutory audit for French limited companies. To illustrate the actual practice of statutory 
auditing, the article examines two major industrial firms: Pont-à-Mousson, a family business 
example of what is called “personal capitalism”, and Saint-Gobain, a very old traditional 
company which could be considered as a managerial firm. In spite of the differences in the 
governance and capital structure of the two companies, in both cases the auditor was considered 
above all “the right-hand man” of the board of directors, playing the role of advisers to the 
board, and working very closely with directors. This evidence is consistent with the findings of 
Popp (2000) and Matthews (2006). 
7. Advancing Accounting Research in Family Firms  
The empirical and theoretical challenges faced by researchers interested in family firms are 
quite similar, irrespective of the field of knowledge. Accounting researchers could benefit from 
the advancement of knowledge in other disciplines such as general management, business or 
economics to further develop an understanding of the role of accounting in family firms. Next, 
we discuss some theoretical and empirical challenges and suggest some avenues for future 
research. 
7.1. Theoretical Challenges – Opportunities 
As noted above, agency theory is by far the most prevalent theoretical framework adopted in 
prior studies on family firms. Interestingly, these studies have help to expand the theoretical 
boundaries of the agency theory by including agency problems and conflicts originally 
overlooked (Madison et al. 2016). Agency theory is also the dominant theoretical framework 
in accounting research in family firms. With few exceptions (e.g., Achleitner et al. 2014; Baños-
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Sánchez et al. 2014), all papers identified in this review follow the insights of the agency theory. 
Future research adopting the agency framework could explore in depth the association between 
complex ownership structures, the role of the family and accounting transparency. One example 
is the case of pyramidal ownership structures, very common but obscure control mechanisms 
which make it difficult to identify who is the most influential shareholder of the firm (Levy 
2009). For example, the controlling family may use pyramidal structures to manipulate earnings 
by means of related party transactions (Bhaumik and Gregoriou 2010). Further evidence on this 
area is needed. Future research could also explore the role of auditors in the context of complex 
ownership structures, where the opportunities and incentives of owners-managers may 
influence auditors’ fraud risk assessments. 
In spite of the dominance of mainstream agency theory, some researchers argue that it “over-
simplifies the complexity of exchange that occur among the family firm’s decision agents” 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino 2002, 247). In a family firm, the agency relationships are 
characterized by the past and ongoing parent-child relationships of the family and, therefore, 
by altruism (Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino 2003). While the classical agency view suggests that 
the ownership should align the interest among family agents, altruism, defined as “a moral value 
that motivates individuals to undertake actions that benefit others without any expectation of 
external reward” (Schulze et al. 2002, 252) may generate other agency problems. Specifically, 
it exposes family firms to adverse selection –the agency threat associated with the lack of ability 
(Schulze et al. 2003, 477). Schulze et al. (2003) use the insights of household economics and 
altruism literature to explain how altruism influences agency relationships in the case of family 
firms. An understanding of the dynamics of family firms taking into account the altruism 
component may help to bring light on issues related to accounting change (e.g., Giovannoni et 
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al. 2011). Specifically, altruism may help to explain the role of different management and 
control practices over the life of the firm, given the different impact that altruism may have on 
the different phases of entrepreneurship. Future research could also explore the role of altruism 
in the demand of formal mechanisms of control, including external mechanisms of governance 
such as auditing.   
Stewardship theory is another prominent perspective in prior research on family firms (Davis, 
Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997; Madison et al. 2016). Instead of assuming the economic 
model of the individual as in the agency theory, the central assumption is a humanistic model 
where managers act as responsible stewards and whose behaviors are aligned with the 
objectives of principals (Madison et al. 2016). In accounting, few papers have adopted the 
stewardship theory, always together with the agency theory (e.g., Prencipe et al. 2008; 
Speckbacher and Wentges 2012). Madison et al. (2016) review the literature on family firms 
through the lens of agency and stewardship theories and identify some future areas of research 
to push the theoretical boundaries of these two frameworks and offer new insights into the 
family firm that could be relevant for accounting researchers examining financial reporting 
quality.   
Recently, several papers on accounting have adopted the SEW approach, which is an extension 
of behavioral agency theory applied to the field of family firms (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 
1998; Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne, and Wiseman 2000; Berrone, Cruz and Gomez-Mejia 2012). 
The behavioral agency theory considers that firms make choices depending on the reference 
point of the principals of the firm. These principals will make decisions so that they can preserve 
accumulated endowment in the firm. In the case of family firms, the emphasis on preserving 
the SEW becomes critical. Importantly, the family may be willing to make decisions driven by 
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a non-economic logic in order to preserve the endowment. Accounting studies assuming the 
SEW approach (Achleitner et al. 2014; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2014; Cruz et al. 2015; Martin et al. 
2016) provide support for some of its insights of the SEW approach. Much more work in 
required on this area –e.g., to test empirically the propositions developed by Gomez-Mejia et 
al. (2014) on SEW and earnings quality.  
The RBV approach assumes that firms are able to sustain their competitive advantage when 
they have valuable and rare resources that cannot be easily imitated or substituted by their 
competitors (Barney 1991). In the case of family firms, the RBV focuses on identifying the 
strategic resources derived from the interaction between the family and the business systems, 
taking into consideration both economic and non-economic factors (Le Breton-Miller, Miller, 
and Bares 2015). Among the family-unique resources and capabilities, prior work places 
emphasis on factors such as human capital, social capital and governance structure and how 
they give advantages or disadvantages to family firms (Sirmon and Hitt 2003). Habbershon and 
Williams (1999) apply the theoretical framework provided by the RBV to family firms and 
define the concept of familiness. Familiness refers to “the unique bundle of resources a 
particular firm has because of the systems interaction between the family, its individual 
members, and the business” (Habbershon and Williams 1999, 11). It is argued that the creation 
of distinctive and enduring familiness may be a driving force behind the vision and goals of 
family firms (for a literature review of the concept familiness see Frank et al. 2010; also 
Pearson, Carr and Shaw 2008). Accounting research could consider insights from this 
framework and adopt the notion of familiness to investigate how and to what extent the 
relationships among family members and their relationships with the business influence on the 
implementation of management control systems and their success or failure. Furthermore, it has 
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been argued that the effect of national culture may be stronger in family firms compared to non-
family firms due to the influence of the national culture on the family organization and structure 
(Vallejo 2011; Fletcher, Melin, and Gimeno 2012). Comparative studies examining the 
implementation of control systems in family firms located in different institutional 
environments may bring some interesting insights about the influence of culture on family firms 
compared to non-family firms.  
Building on the work of Habbershon and Williams (1999), social capital theory has been 
adopted as a framework to examine some dimensions of familiness that the RBV does not take 
into account (Pearson et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2010). Arregle et al. (2007) investigate the link 
between family’s social capital and family firms’ social capital and provide a conceptual 
framework to analyze family firms from a social capital perspective. Research in the accounting 
field has shown that the social capital of board members influences on firm’s future 
performance and financial reporting quality (e.g., Horton, Millo, and Serafeim 2012; Carrera, 
Carmona, and Sohail 2017). Future accounting research could investigate how family firms’ 
social capital, family’s social capital and the interaction of both influence on the control 
mechanisms for financial reporting.  
Lastly, our literature review shows that there are examples of accounting studies going beyond 
the “traditional” approach and exploring accounting issues in family firms through the lenses 
of the institutional theory (Bernadich 2015; Mengoli and Pazzaglia 2017) and the institutional 
entrepreneurship theory (Baños-Sanchez Matamoros et al. 2014). We encourage accounting 
researchers to further explore the opportunities brought by alternative theoretical approaches. 
For example, consider the insights of systems theory (e.g., Frank et al. 2010), the social 
exchange theory (Daspit et al. 2015) or a combination of theoretical approaches (e.g., Vallejo 
 
Volume 2, Number 2, 97-159, July-December 2017                  doi:10.1344/jesb2017.2.j032 
          doi.org/10.1344/JESB201x.x.j0xx  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
142 
2011; Che and Langli 2015; Le Breton-Miller et al. 2015), all of which have been proved valid 
to examine issues arising in the context of family businesses.11  
7.2. Empirical Challenges – Opportunities 
As shown in the previous sections, most studies on accounting and family firms are empirical 
and quantitative. This trend is observed in other areas such as general management and 
business.12 In accounting, most studies rely on archival data, typically information from the 
annual reports, and apply statistical techniques such as regression analysis. Besides the 
problems related to the reliability of data and missing information, particularly relevant in the 
case of small-and-medium family firms and in privately-held family firms (Stewart and Miner 
2011), researchers face the challenge of defining what “family business” means and how to 
operationalize the construct as explained in Section Defining Family Firms. Prencipe et al. 
(2014, 367-368) discuss this issue in detail and highlight how the focus over the past few years 
have shifted from dichotomous definitions to identify family and non-family firms to more 
articulated definitions, which allow to consider the heterogeneity within family firms. As 
stressed by prior studies (e.g., Songini et al. 2013) there is a clear need to pay attention to 
within-group differences of family business. Steier et al. (2015) refer to the importance of 
differentiate the controlling family as a “business family” and as a “family business”: in the 
former, the family owns one or more businesses and these businesses may change over time; in 
the later, the family owns the business and it wants the next generation to take over. Another 
possibility is to use continue variables to measure family involvement, experience and power, 
                                                          
11 Vallejo (2011) proposes a model to measure the culture of family firms that integrates propositions derived from 
the general system theory, socialization theory, neoinstitutional theory, transformational leadership theory, 
learning theory, field theory, and group dynamics theory. Le Breton-Miller et al. (2015) combines agency theory, 
behavioral agency perspectives, and the RBV of the firm. 
12 See Evert et al. (2016) for a review of empirics in family business research and Fletcher, De Massis, and 
Nordqvist (2016) for a review of qualitative research in this area. 
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as suggested by Astrachan et al. (2002) and Klein et al. (2005). Differences within family firms 
may influence on accounting decisions, as some prior studies have shown (e.g. Corten et al. 
(2017) in the case of auditing). Future research could further explore the heterogeneity of family 
firms and to what extent it influences on accounting decisions. For example, using content 
analysis of organizational narratives (e.g., Kothari, Li, and Short 2009), researchers could 
explore the disclosures of different types of family firms, their drivers and their outcomes.  
On this review, few papers rely on data from questionnaires and surveys (Samuelsson et al. 
2016; Cesaroni and Sentuti 2017; Collin et al. 2017; Corten et al. 2017), none of them in the 
area of financial accounting. There is an opportunity in the use of these techniques for 
measuring dimensions related to family power, influence or control through, for example, 
psychometric instruments which could be used in studies assessing the financial reporting 
quality of the firm and/or accounting choices of family firms. These tools also allow the 
researcher to collect data on demographic characteristics (e.g., education, social ties and age of 
the founders) which may help to capture the “family effect”. Berrone et al. (2012) provide some 
insights about how to operationalize and measure the different dimensions included in the 
concept of SEW using data collected from surveys, content analysis or experiments. This data 
could be used to test the influence of the dimension “family identity” on financial reporting 
quality (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2014). Surveys could also be used to collect data for multilevel 
analysis, exploring the impact of accounting at a firm level and at an individual level –for 
example, studies examining management control systems at family firms and/or about the 
perception of auditing.  
Another area that could be explored further is the use of panel data and longitudinal analysis 
(Benavides-Velasco, Guzmán-Parra, and Quintana-García 2011). As highlighted by Evert et al. 
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(2016), time is a key component in family businesses. Most prior research on accounting and 
family firms does not consider explicitly the time dimension. Future research should 
contemplate the possibility of developing longitudinal analysis and panel data, in line with the 
suggestions for future research examining family firms in other fields (Evert et al. 2016; 
Benavides-Velasco et al. 2011). 
As highlighted by prior reviews, there is a lack of experimental and decision-making studies in 
accounting and family firms. Trotman and Trotman (2010) provide an in-depth discussion of 
the stream of research in auditing based on conceptual frameworks developed within 
psychology to evaluate, among other issues, the quality of audit judgments, the factors that 
influence auditors’ judgment performance and the cognitive processes used by auditors. They 
highlight the potential of this approach to get a better understanding of the differences in the 
audit task, the auditor and her/his attributes and the interaction between the auditor and other 
stakeholders between family and nonfamily businesses, and how these differences could 
potential influence on auditors’ judgment.  Like in the area of auditing, researchers examining 
managerial accounting issues at family firms could also benefit from adopting conceptual 
frameworks developed within family psychology to better understand what actually being a 
“family business” makes in the implementation of management accounting practices and 
control systems.  
As pointed out by prior studies (e.g., Evert et al. 2016, Fletcher et al. 2016), there are significant 
opportunities for qualitative studies adopting methods such as ethnographies or case studies 
that allow researchers to better understand the unique characteristics of family businesses. 
Furthermore, compared to quantitative methods, qualitative approaches offer the researcher the 
possibility to “build a holistic perspective of the phenomenon under study and to observe the 
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development of a phenomenon over time” (Fletcher et al. 2016, 18). Case studies are the most 
used qualitative methodology in family business research so far (De Massis and Kotlar 201413). 
While they are widely used by accounting historians and researchers exploring management 
accounting practices, its use in accounting research in family firms is still limited. Case studies 
could be used to develop research on management accounting and control, an area where much 
more work needs to be done (e.g., Songini et al. 2013; Prencipe et al. 2014). They could also 
be used to investigate further the cross-country differences in the adoption and implementation 
of management accounting practices and how control and management accounting systems 
influence on succession in different settings. Special interest could be paid to research in 
accounting practices of family firms in developing countries were these firms may play a 
significant role in the economic development. Case studies can be fruitful for the analysis of 
the drivers and consequences of professionalization in family firms as well as for the analysis 
the role of accounting in family business failure and survival. They could also be applied to 
investigation of family leaders’ biographies to assess their role in fostering or hindering 
accounting change (e.g., Parker 2014).  
Finally, we should also consider the possibility of using mixed methods, combining quantitative 
and qualitative approaches (e.g., Björnberg and Nicholson 2012). 
8. Closing Remarks 
This paper reviews research on accounting in family firms. Overall, this study and prior 
literature reviews show that research on accounting in family firms has been dominated by 
accounting scholars with expertise in financial accounting interested in issues such as financial 
                                                          
13 De Massis and Kotlar (2014) provide good guidelines on how to use case studies in family business research. 
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reporting quality, earnings management and accounting policy choices from an agency 
perspective. Most of these studies provide insights about to what extent the financial reporting 
practices of family firms differ from those of non-family firms. We observe an increasing 
interest in family firms by researchers specialized in auditing as well as management accounting 
and control. Interestingly, over time accounting researchers seems to be more and more open 
to adopt alternative theoretical approaches beyond the agency theory framework, as shown by 
recent studies using the SEW approach. In this study, we include the contributions of accounting 
history to family business research, an area neglected in prior literature reviews. The studies 
reviewed show how fruitful can be a historical perspective to understand the role of accounting 
and accountants in the survival and failure of family firms as well as understanding their role 
in the development of accounting and auditing in society.  
The interaction between accountants and researchers from other areas of knowledge related to 
family firms such as management and economics can be particularly rewarding. An 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of family firms, bringing together researchers from 
different disciplines, could help to overcome some of the current challenges of studies on family 
firms and develop some of the ideas presented in this review. 
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